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INTRODUCTION

It was only after increased investment in foreign-based mutual funds
by the German public' that the Federal Republic of Germany attempted
to regulate the sale of these funds in its territory.' The West German
government, upon the submission of its regulatory proposal to the Bundestag, noted that "[tihe importance and bulk of these [foreign-based
mutual fund] distributions [had] reached an order of magnitude that
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia, School of Law. B.A., Yale 1961; J.D.,
University of North Carolina. Member of Georgia and North Carolina Bars.
'The net capital outflow from Germany resulting from purchases of investment trust certificates
rose from an average of $8 million in the period 1961-63 to $40 million in 1966 and then to $240
million in 1968. ORGANIZATIONS FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter
cited as OECD), COMMITTEE FOR INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS, The Capital Market, International
Capital Movements, Restrictions on Capital Operations in Germany 30 (1969). This growth is
perhaps best illustrated by the record of Bernard Cornfeld's Investors Overseas Services Ltd. (SA)
(I.O.S.) which sold $4.8 million (face amount) in investment contracts in West Germany in 1964
and $257 million in 1969. RAW, PAGE & HODGSON, Do YOU SINCERELY WANT TO BE RICH? 18889 (1971). Of course, only a portion of the face amount of these contracts would be paid immediately, and after sales loads, even less would go into assets under management. For a brief discussion
of the attractiveness of the German market to I.O.S. salesmen see id. at 185-87.
2
Domestic investment institutions (Kapitalanlagegesellschaften), managing funds and selling
fund units had been regulated since 1957 by The Investment Institutions Act, Law of April 16,
1957, [1957] BGBI. 1 378 [Gesetz uber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften vom 16 April 19571 (hereinafter cited as the 1957 Investment Company Statute). This Act was amended and recodified in
1970 ([1970] BGBI. 1/127) and all references will be to the Act as amended. For a brief general
discussion of the Statute see TORMANN, THE INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS 19-30 (English ed. 1965).
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[made] legislative initiative action necessary." 3 It was noted further
that "the coexistence of domestic investment companies, which must
observe the provisions of a strong protective statute in the interest of
the investor, and foreign companies, which are not even subject to a
comparable statute in their home countries, can lead to serious disturb4
ance in the competitive relations between the two groups."1
In the summer of 1972, observing that "recent developments in this
field have not been entirely painless," 5 the Committee on Financial
Markets of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposed "Standard Rules for the Operation of Institutions for Collective Investment in Securities" which "it might be desirable for institutions to observe which operate in Member countries or
which have access to residents of Member countries . . . to protect
those residents who in their own Member country invest in securities of
domestic and of foreign institutions for collective investment." '
The purpose of this article is to provide a framework for the compara3

Begrflndung des Regierungsentwurfes zu dem Gesetz fiber den Vertrieb auslfindischer
Investmentanteile and fiber die Besteuerung ihre Ertrige vor 28. Juli 1969, 5th election period,
document V/3494 (1968), as excerpted and translated in BROCHER & PULCH, THE GERMAN LAW
CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHARES 51 (Bilingual ed. 1970).

[hereinafter cited as Brficher & Pulch] (Except as otherwise noted, all translations into English are
those of the source cited, with some minor alterations).
4
1d.
'ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS, STANDARD RULES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT IN SECURITIES 9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as OECD Standard Rules]. The introduction to

the OECD Standard Rules continues: "Sales of collective investment securities are frequently
linked to complex long-term savings plans the real merits of which are not easy to judge. Promotion
was sometimes unscrupulous and in such cases the mainspring for the success of the institutions
for collective investment turned out to be a serious . . . weakness which did much harm to the
reputation of the industry as a whole."
'OECD Standard Rules 10. The Committee on Financial Markets has announced that it "intends to watch the reactions to the standard rules of the collective investment industry, to review
periodically the use to which they are being put or the extent to which they are being implemented
and to consider the possibility of their improvement in the light of practical experience." OECD
Standard Rules I1. See also the 34th and 35th Standard Rules and comments thereunder, OECD
Standard Rules 51-52.
The OECD has by no means been the only international organization active in this area. On
October 12, 1972, the Council of Europe published "European Rules for Investment Funds,"
recommending that Member States "make their laws and practice relating to investment funds
conform with the [Council] rules . . . without prejudice to more favourable rules which may be
laid down in the interest of participants." For the English text of these rules see 12 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS 100 (1973). While the Council's rules are substantially similar, both in philosophy and in
substantive detail, to the OECD Standard Rules, the latter are probably more significant since they
are potentially applicable to major capital markets outside of Europe, viz. Japan and the United
States.

1973]

REGULATING COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT

tive and critical examination of the West German Statute Concerning
the Distribution of Foreign Investment Shares and the Taxation of their
Proceeds of 28 July 19691 and the OECD Standard Rules. The reference
point for this framework is the United States Investment Company Act
of 19401 which is not only the most pervasive of the regulatory schemes
affecting collective investment institutions but also undoubtedly the
scheme most familiar to most readers.
As with most marketing practice regulation, the history of the control
of mutual fund sales consists very substantially of instances of locking
the barn door after the horses have been stolen.' The tendency is to deal
ad hoc with abuses, either in the organizational structure and function
of the fund entity 0 itself or in the methods by which it is offered to the
consuming public. Even in light of the observation that it is a part of
the human condition that the ingenuity of the promoters may always
run ahead of the imagination of the regulators, the transnational scope
of mutual fund operations in recent years" points up the potential value
'Law of July 28, 1969, [1969] BGBI. I 986. [hereinafter cited as 1969 Foreign Investment Shares
Statute].
15 U.S.C. §§80a-I to -52 (1970).
'In its opening provisions the Investment Company Act of 1940 lists eight conditions in which
"the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected" and which "the
policy and purposes of [the Act] . . .are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate ..
"
Investment Company Act of 1940 § I(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1970). For detailed descriptions
of these conditions see SEC Report on the Study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
Parts Ill, Abuses and Deficiencies in the Organization and Operation of Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies, chs. 1-6, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939-40), ch. 7, H.R.
Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) and Part IV, Control and Influence over Industry and
Economic Significance of Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941). For a more recent description of the operations of United States-based mutual funds (and
of the effect of foreign-based funds on the United States market) see SEC Institutional Investor
Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971).
" n the legal and general literature concerning this subject the terms "investment company,"
"investment trust," "institution for collective investment" etc. have been used as generic identifications. The diversity in terminology undoubtedly results from the diversity in legal entity forms dealt
with in foreign investment activities. In this article the term "mutual fund" will generally be used
to describe any type of "institution for collective investment in securities." What the term lacks in
precision it makes up in easy identification.
"Admittedly, this has been almost exclusively a one-way street. The Interest Equalization Tax
Act, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4911-21, 4931, 6011(d), 6076, 6680 and 7241, which became
effective July 19, 1963, and is expected to extend at least through the end of 1973, effectively
discourages any investment in foreign securities by a United States resident taxpayer by imposing
a 11.25% tax on their acquisition (from foreigners) of the securities of foreign issuers. See particularly INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4920(a)(3)(B) and 4920(e). The attractiveness of the American
securities trading markets has also been a substantial factor.
On April 3, 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission submitted legislative proposals to
Congress which would amend § 7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Subchapter M of
Chapter I of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 to create a "Foreign Portfolio Sales Corporation" which
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of drawing on comparative experiences in the formulation and construction of regulatory schemes." This article will identify a number of the
areas in which the American experience with the Investment Company
Act of 1940 has obviously been utilized in this process and will provide
several suggestions as to the manner in which further contributions to
the regulatory process might be drawn from comparative and empirical
studies.
It is interesting to observe that at the same time that West Germany,
and other European countries, and the OECD were engaged in broadening and developing standards for the regulation of mutual funds the
United States was engaged in the substantial debate and controversy
which resulted in the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970.11
This article will discuss the relevant regulatory changes contained in
these amendments and the problems with which they were intended to
deal in the context of similar problems arising under the West German
and OECD regulatory schemes.
I.

AREAS OF REGULATORY IMPACT

It is possible at this point to identify, albeit somewhat arbitrarily,
fourteen key factors in the organization, management, and sale of mutual funds which seem to require, or have traditionally been subject to
a certain amount of regulatory impact. These factors may be arranged,
without reference to their importance, according to their relationship to
the sale of mutual fund shares, the organization and operation of the
fund itself, and the sale or redemption of shares.
would be subject to the regulatory requirements of the 1940 Act but would be relieved of most of
the burdens of United States taxation, particularly the capital gains tax. Funds qualifying as
FPSCs would not be permitted to sell their shares to citizens and residents of the United States
but would be required to invest at least 75 percent of their portfolios in United States stock or
securities (not including securities of foreign finance companies, securities of United States companies or of domestic finance subsidiaries raising capital for use outside the United States). Investment Company Act Release No. 7751 (1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79, 306.
2
1n fact, in drafting the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute, the West German government
drew on the experience of officials of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND "OFFSHORE"

INVESTMENT FUNDS,

Corporate Law and Practice Transcript Series No. 2 (1969) at p. 389 (Remarks by Allan S.
Mostoff, then Associate Director, Division of Corporate Regulation, Securities and Exchange
Commission). Solomon Freedman, then Director, Division of Corporate Regulation, Securities
and Exchange Commission and now Special Consultant to the SEC, was one of the two United
States experts who participated in the drafting of the OECD Standard Rules.
3
Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1940).
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Sale of Mutual Fund Shares
I) The disclosure of information, particularly that concerning investment policy, to the prospective buyer prior to the sale.
2) The "sales load," i.e., the size of the sales commission charged.
3) "Front end loading," i.e., the distribution of the sales charges over
time in respect to investment plans requiring regular periodic payments.
4) The buyer's right of rescission.
OrganizationalStructure of the Mutual Fund
5) The
tual.
6) The
a)
b)
c)
7)

form of the entity, i.e., trust account, corporate, or contraccontrol by shareholders or unit holders:
with respect to by-laws;
with respect to investment policy; and
with respect to management contracts and fees.

The existence and rights of different classes of securities and debts.

Investment Operations of the Mutual Fund
8)
9)

The time and method of the valuation of shares or fund units.
The independence of management in relation to:
a) duty to shareholders;
b) self-dealing and dealing with related parties.

10) The character of investments and investment policy-securities
only? (publicly traded only?), real estate, short sales and hedge funds.
1 I) The size and computation of management fees-performance fees.
Redemption or Sale of Mutual Fund Shares by the Investor
12) The right of redemption-open- and closed-end funds.
13) The events which trigger the suspension of rights of redemption
and the effects of such suspension.
14) The depository protections afforded the shareholders' rights in
fund assets.
There exists an additional factor in the regulation of mutual funds
which is both a special creation of regulatory schemes and a major
incentive, or disincentive, to the mutual fund investment decision. This
is the domestic tax treatment of holders in respect to the fund's distributed or undistributed income and appreciation. 4 The second part of the
"The tax treatment of the fund entity itself is less significant since if substantial relief from
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West German 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute" substantially
equalizes the treatment of the holders of shares of foreign-based funds
which meet the requirements of the Statute or are traded on the West
German stock exchanges with the treatment of the holders of shares of
domestic mutual funds." This is perhaps a sugar-coating on the regulatory pill. The comparison and harmonization of tax regulation in respect to mutual fund investment is, however, beyond the scope of this
inquiry, particularly since its impact on investor protection is necessarily minimal.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL

Focus

Before proceeding into a detailed analysis of the impact of the West
German Statute and the Standard Rules on the above itemized factors
it is necessary to describe the legal means by which the regulation of
mutual funds is effected. If the fund entity and its management are
domiciled within the regulating jurisdiction the matter of in personam
control is easily solved. But the problem becomes more difficult if, as
is by definition the case with "offshore" mutual funds, the contact with
the jurisdiction is something less. Two principal types of activities within
a jurisdiction which have been said to support the exercise of regulatory
control over mutual funds and their management are 1) use of the
domestic capital market mechanisms for effecting portfolio investment
decisions and trades 7 and 2) domestic sales activity.
The jurisdictional focus of the West German 1969 Foreign Investtaxation at the entity level is not available domestically (as it is in the United States with Subchapter M of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 851-855, and as it is in West Germany with § 38 of the
1957 Investment Company Statute) it is to be assumed that the fund entity will be formed and
domiciled in a country which provides such (or greater) relief, i.e., a "tax haven" country.
11196 9 Foreign Investment Shares Statute §§ 16-20.
"Compare 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 17 with id. § 18.
"7The attractiveness of the American securities market has meant that a substantial amount of
this activity has taken place within United States jurisdiction. The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that such activity is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on United States courts, at least in respect to violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In the Matter of lOS, Ltd (SA), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78, 637 at pp. 81, 360-61 (March 14,
1972), petition for Commission review pending. See also Memorandum of Plaintiff Securities and
Exchange Commission in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Ancillary Relief in
SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (C.E.S.) (S.D.N.Y. filed November 27, 1972). It has also been
suggested that use of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the United States when
portfolio management, custodial and depository functions related to an offshore fund are performed in the United States may be sufficient to require registration by the fund under § 7(d) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1970). Remarks of Allan S. Mostoff,
supra note 12 at 392-94. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c) (iii) (1968); Investment Company Act
Release No. 5618 (Feb. 25, 1969), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,671 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder].
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ment Shares Statute is upon the sales activities of foreign-based mutual
funds. Section 2 of the Statute outlines the basic conditions which must
be satisfied if foreign-based mutual funds shares are to be distributed
or sold in West Germany,"8 and § 13(2) imposes a fine of up to 50,000
DM on any person who, willfully or negligently distributes foreignbased mutual fund shares when the notification, 9 waiting period,20 and
stop-order 2 provisions of the Statute are violated. The Federal Supervisory Office for Credit Affairs (Bundesaufsichtsamt fir Kreditwesen),
which is charged with administration of the Statute, may also, by
regulation, prohibit improper and misleading sales and promotion techniques 3 and stop distribution of a foreign-based mutual fund's shares
if violations of these regulations persist after a warning from the Supervisory Office,24 even though the fund has complied with the other conditions of the statute.
The OECD Standard Rules are concerned both with domestic mutual
funds organized in the regulating country 5 and with "foreign institutions for collective investment that actively solicit and promote sales"
in that country." The following comments of the Committee with respect to the 34th Standard Rule on Official Surveillance are relevant
here:
The Committee considers that the supervisory authority of each
member country must exercise a surveillance over all c.i.i.s.
[institutions for collective investment in securities] established in their
country.
It also feels that the supervisory authority of each member country
must be free to take any measures they consider necessary to protect
I"19 6 9

Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2. Section I of the Statute limits its application to

distributions "by means of public offers, public advertising, promotion or solicitation or similar
means." Private offerings, in the Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970) sense,
and such things as participations in investment partnerships thus presumably do not come under
the statute.
Section 1(2) of the Statute excludes from coverage "foreign investment shares which are admitted for official trading on a German stock exchange so far as, with the exception of the publications
required by the stock exchange, no distribution within the meaning of § 1(1) takes place."
1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 7(l).
-1d. § 8(1).
2
.1d.
§§ 8(2)(3), 10(2).

-Id. § 14.
-1d. § 10(1).
§ 10(2).
2
'Domestic fund sales in West Germany are, of course, regulated by the 1957 Investment Company Statute. See TORMANN, supra note 1.
2
OECD Standard Rules 19.
2

U1d.
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the local participating investors of foreign c.i.i.s. The Swiss expert
stressed, however, that supervision exercised outside the country in
which a c.i.i. is established would necessarily be subsidiary and indirect
(e.g., for checking accounts).

The Committee notes that it is possible for a c.i.i. to be organized
under the laws of a Member country without the supervisory authority
of that country having the power to oversee and control the activities
of such c.i.i. unpess the securities of the c.i.i. are sold domestically. In

such a situation the Committee presumes that the supervisory authority of any Member country where these
securities are publicly sold will
27
exercise adequate official surveillance.
The Committee also expressed the opinion that
[w]hen considering applications for admission from foreign institutions which comply with the standard rules, Member countries should
give substantial weight to the fact of such compliance and within the
general framework of the domestic regulations, compliance with any
28
restrictive requirements might in such cases be liberally interpreted.
Jurisdiction over foreign-based mutual funds has not, however, been
limited to the control of sales-related activities within the regulating
countries. Both the West German 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute and the OECD Standard Rules provide a basis for more pervasive
supervision of the fund's internal structure and operation through the
requirement that a domestic agent be designated. 29 Though the function
of the designated agent is primarily that of the receipt of the service of
legal process, it is clear that the designation of such an agent will subject
30
both the fund's full assets and its management to domestic sanctions.
In this connection it is interesting to observe that the West German
government rejected as "not practical" the theoretically simple means
of regulating foreign-based mutual funds through subjecting them to the
controls of the 1957 Investment Company Statute because the Federal
2

1OECD Standard Rules 51 (emphasis added and paragraph numbers omitted).
1OECD Standard Rules 11. It is understood that the Securities and Exchange Commission
has agreed, at least informally, to follow this in its enforcement of § 7(d) of the Investment
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1940).
21l969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(1), OECD Standard Rules 48 (30th Rule). The
Statute states that the agent is to be a domestic bank or a "reliable, professionally suitable person,"
whereas the Standard Rules provide only that the agent must be "acceptable to the supervisory
authority." It was thought in West Germany that to limit the role of agent to banks only, would
be violative of constitutional equal opportunity provisions. Regierungsentwurf in BROtCHER &
PULCH, supra note 3, at 61.
'"Cf Investment Company Act of 1940 § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1970).
2
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Supervisory Office for Credit Affairs could not conduct the type of
examination of "quality" to which the management and operation of a
domestic mutual fund are subjected and because strict adherence to the
domestic West German law might have been impossible when that law
conflicted with similar provisions in the law of the jurisdiction in which
the fund is organized or based."' In contrast to the domestic regulatory
scheme, "a concept for this [foreign investment shares] statute has been
consciously chosen which will avoid the impression that a comprehensive investigation of good quality by German administrative authority
has preceeded the distribution 32 and which depends very substantially
on disclosure of relevant information to the investor in order that he
may arrive at his own conclusions as to the quality and appropriateness
of his proposed investment.

III.

3

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

Any regulatory scheme which relies on intelligent discrimination by
the investment public based on the disclosure of relevant information
must provide an effective means of assuring the accuracy and completeness of the information which is provided. If the regulating authority is
to supervise this disclosure to any degree greater than satisfying itself
that the fund has complied with the statutory minima it will soon find
itself in a role that is substantially the same as making investigations
of quality. Traditionally, when disclosure is the regulatory vehicle, the
individual investor bears the burden not only of evaluating the information that is disclosed but also of assuring that the information is accur3t

Regierungsentwurf in BROCHER & PULCH, supra note 3, at 53.
"I1d. at 55. Compare 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 10(2), with Securities Act of
1933 § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (Supp. 1, 1972).
'The question very obviously obviously arises: is the average West German investor in any
better position than the Federal Supervisory Agency for Credit Affairs to make judgments about
the quality of foreign-based investment shares being offered to him? Answering this in the negative
still leaves unanswered the very basic question of the role of disclosure in the regulation of securities
sales, more acute here, certainly, since investors in mutual fund shares may be apt to be less
financially sophisticated than investors in common equity stocks. The contrast between West
German regulation of domestic and foreign-based mutual fund offerings suggests an opportunity
for empirical research into the effectiveness of the two types of regulatory schemes, unfortunately
an opportunity as yet ignored. In the absence of empirical data, this article can only observe and
focus upon the statutory limitations which are thought necessary, in addition to the requirements
of disclosure and the statutory mechanism aimed at providing effective disclosure.
One suspects, nevertheless, that the omission of foreign-based mutual funds from the ambit of
official Bonitatsprufung is based more on considerations of administrative convenience than on
faith in disclosure as the ultimate tool in securities regulation. For a discussion of some of the
alleged inadequacies in disclosure material, as it has developed in practice under United States law
see Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman. 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973).
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ate and complete, primarily through his right of rescission or by an
action for damages when the information is either inaccurate or incomplete. Admittedly, in United States practice the investor may actually
bear little of the burden since § 8(d) of the Securities Act of 1933
empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue stop orders
suspending registration, "if it appears to the Commission at any time
that the registration statement includes any untrue statement of material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statement therein not misleading ' 34 and
§ 20(b) of the same Act authorizes the Commission to obtain injunctive
relief in respect to violations of the securities laws generally.3 5 Under
the West German 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute, however,
incorrect or incomplete statements of a material nature in the notification statement or in the sales prospectus are not among the specific
grounds upon which § 8(3) of the Statute permits the Federal Supervisory Agency for Credit Affairs to prohibit the distribution of foreign
investment shares.36 Thus the sanction against fraudulent, misleading,
or omitted material information lies solely in the investor's right to
rescission contained in § 12 of the Statute.
The OECD Standard Rules make no provision with respect to the
investor's right of rescission, but they are, after all, minimum standards. The second Standard Rule provides that even though the sales
prospectus, "which shall be available to the public, . . . shall be submitted to the supervisory authority before a [mutual fund] begins to operate" within the jurisdiction, the supervisory authority which is to "verify
that it contains all the information required . . . will not approve its
substance. ' 3 In a regulatory scheme which thus places the burden of
evaluation on the investor rather than on the regulator, it would appear
to be a very serious omission, even from minimum standards, to fail to
provide a mechanism, in addition to any local law of fraudulent misrepresentation, by which to insure the accuracy and completeness of
the information.
The right of rescission under the West German law is, by American
U.S.C. § 77h (1970).
U.S.C. § 77t (1970).
3
4Arguably, if the information contained in the sales prospectus is inaccurate or incomplete, the
requirements of § 3 with respect to the contents of the sales prospectus have not been complied
with and therefore the § 2(5) prerequisite to distribution is not satisfied. But once distribution has
begun § 8(3) (2) requires the Supervisory Agency to prohibit further distribution when "a prerequisite pursuant to 2(l)-(4) has ceased to exist"!
7
OECD Standard Rules 23 (emphasis added).
3415
315
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standards at least, severely limited. This right exists only against the
mutual fund, its management company, or sales company. Directors,
professional experts, and other persons are not liable for damages in a
manner similar to that provided in § I I of the Securities Act of 1933.18
While the maximum period of liability under the German law, extending
for three years after a sale, is the same as that under the '33 Act,3" the
German investor has but six months, rather than one year,40 in which
to bring suit after the error or deficiency of the sales prospectus becomes
known."' A provision which is perhaps even more detrimental to the
German investor's position is § 12(3) of the 1969 Foreign Investment
Shares Statute which allows any company, including the issuer of the
mutual fund shares, to escape liability for rescission if it "shows that it
did not know of the incorrectness of the sales prospectus and the lack
of knowledge was not based on gross negligence." 42 While this section
is to some extent patterned on § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, the
broader liabilities of § I I of that Act, to which the issuer has not even
a due diligence defense,43 have been ignored in the German law. The
mutual fund's responsibility for its own statements is thus considerably
less than absolute.
IV.

INVESTMENT COMPANY DEFINED

Before itemizing the limitations that the regulatory schemes place on
fund sales, structure, and operation it is important to note the entities
which are identified as mutual funds, "institutions for collective investment in securities," and are thus subjected to these regulatory schemes.
The 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute applies to "funds
[Vermigen] existing under foreign law" which are composed of securities or real estate and which are "invested pursuant to the principle of
diversifying risk."" The last-quoted phrase is a key one which the legis- 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
3115
U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
40
1d.
'11969 Foreign Investment Company Shares Statute § 12(5).
4
Id. § 12(3). Compare § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 which exempts any person who
"sustain[s] the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of such untruth or omission."
"3 For extensive discussion of the due diligence defense and its limits under United States law
see Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968) and Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case - Part I - Section Il of the
Securities Act of 1933, and Part 1I - The Broader Implications, 55 VA. L. REV. I & 199 (1969).
"1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 1.In addition, this section of the Statute focuses
on the public distribution of the shares of such funds.
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lative history describes as "decisive" and notes further that "it is not
only the shares of those funds which place the minimizing of all possible
risk in the foreground which fall under the provisions. Rather the law
is applicable also to growth funds for which the prime motive of investment policy is increasing value." 4
The OECD Standard Rules apply to
an institution for collective investment in securities which, applying the
principle of risk spreading, has as its object the management of a
po'rtfolio of securities; which distributes its shares to the public by
issuing share certificates or entering the name of the participating
investor in a register; and which is required upon the request of the
participating investor to redeem directly or indirectly a share it has

issued.4"
The scope of the Standard Rules is therefore less ambitious than that
of the German Statute in that it does not attempt to deal with real estate
funds nor with closed-end funds. The German Statute deals with these
funds by effectively prohibiting them, i.e., by requiring that the fund
contract redeem its shares on demand by the shareholder.47 Since both
regulatory schemes focus on intentional risk spreading through diversification, there is no possibility of obtaining an unintentional investment
company status such as exists under the 40-per-cent-of-assets rule of
§ 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.48 Neither of the
schemes provides any further definition of diversification, such as the
Investment Company Act formula for a 'diversified" management
company,4 9 though, as will be seen, both actively require diversification
through restrictions on investment and ownership. 0
Neither regulatory scheme expresses a preference for any particular
form or legal entity nor distinguishes in any respect among mutual funds
organized as corporations or as trusts or other contractual arrangements. The liberality of the OECD Standard Rules is completely understandable since they must cover a wide variety of jurisdictions which
utilize differing organizational forms. Such liberality is noteworthy in
the West German law, however, since domestically organized mutual
funds sold in Germany must be held in the joint account form separate
from its own assets and by a management company organized in the
45

BR(JCHER & PULCH, supra note 3, at 59.
"nOECD Standard Rules 21 (emphasis added).
411969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4) (b).
'115 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1970).
"9Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1) (1970).
"'See pp. 244, 249-50 infra.
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corporate form (Aktiengesellschaft or Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
Haftung).5 ' Restrictions are placed on the transfer of stock in the management company" and a supervising board of directors (Aufsichtsrat)
is required whether the corporation is private or public. 3 In contrast
to domestic management companies, which must have minimum paidin capital of 500,000 DM,54 foreign-based funds operating in Germany
are not subject to even minimal capital requirements. If, as the legislative history indicates, the application of such restrictions is undesirable
if it would eliminate from the German market "so far unobjectionably
functioning investment companies which are domiciled in highly developed countries lacking investment supervision" the restrictions on domestic fund operations become increasingly difficult to justify."
V.

REGULATORY IMPACT

With the jurisdictional
schemes firmly in mind, it
specific regulatory handling
which have previously been
A.

and definitional focus of the regulatory
is now appropriate to discuss seriatim the
of the key factors in mutual fund operations
identified.5

Disclosure of Information to the Prospective Buyer

The 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute and the OECD Standard Rules and the United States statutes,57 contemplate the use of
informational sales literature which is to be given to the purchaser 5 or
at least "available to the public."59 Both list, to some extent, the items
of information which are to be included, and the West German Statute
111957 Investment Company Statute §§ 1,3.
52

Id. § 1(3)-(4).
"Id. § 3.

5
11d. § 2(2). This theoretically assures solvency of the management company-there is no minimal fund size such as that contained in § 14 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-14 (1970). The OECD Standard Rules, in the 17th Rule, require a minimum capital in either
the fund or its management company, "the equivalent of 100,000 to 125,000 units of account."
OECD Standard Rules 35.
"Of course, just such disparity has been the principle encouragement to the creation and existence of "offshore" funds.
"'See pp. 218-20 supra.
"7A share of stock or other interest in an investment company is a security within the definition
of § 2(l) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970), and is thereby subject to the
provisions of that Act, including § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1970), requiring the delivery of
a statutory prospectus (see § 2(10) and § 10) prior to or contemporaneously with the delivery of a
security through the mails or in interstate commerce. Cf Investment Company Act 1940 § 24, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1970).
'1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3(l).
"OECD Standard Rules 23 (2nd Rule).
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is supplemented by guidelines promulgated by the Federal Supervisory
66
Office for Credit Affairs.
The OECD Standard Rules list the following items which are to be
dealt with in the prospectus:
I. "A description of the general aims and objectives of the c.i.i.;"'"
2. "information concerning its legal structure;""2
3. "an up-to-date financial statement which shows the size and distribution of the assets of the c.i.i., its operating expenses and the income
distributed to the participating investors for each of the last three to five
'6 3
years;
4. "all material information on the individuals or legal entities responsible for the direction, management, investment advice trusteeship, custody of the portfolio and sale of the shares of the c.i.i.;'64
5. "the name and address of the agent through whom legal papers can
be served upon the c.i.i.;"65
6. "the name of any major company with which the investment advis6
ers might be associated;
7. a full explanation of "rates and methods of calculation of any sales
and redemption charges and of the management fees and costs, as well
as periods over which they will be levied;" 7
8. "method and procedure of the valuation of the assets;"6 6
9. "the obligation [in the 7th Rule] to make available for publication
and to any person, free of charge, the net asset value per share and the
sales price per share and the redemption price per share [and] where and
how this information may be obtained;" 9
10. "how frequently calculations of the net asset value, the sales price
and the redemption price shall be made." 7
Section 3(2) of the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute initially
"Federal Supervisory Agency for Banking Guidelines for Notifications Pursuant to § 7 of the
1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute, para. 15 (August 26, 1969) [Merkblatt fur Anziegen nach
§ 7 AuslinvestmG] reprinted in BROCHER & PULCH supra note 3 at, 112-19. [hereinafter cited as
Regs. of Aug. 26, 1969]. Authority for this part of the regulations is the last sentence of § 3 of the
1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute.
"OECD Standard Rules 23 (2nd Rule).
421d.
3
0 1d.
"Id. at 24 (3rd Rule).
65Id.
"Ild.
7
Id. (4th Rule).
1"Id. at 37 (19th Rule).
"Id. at 27 (7th Rule).
7
"Id. at 42 (25th Rule).
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requires that the prospectus contain "all declarations which are of substantial meaning in the judgment [of the quality] of the foreign investment shares.7 ' With the exception of the sixth and the tenth items, each
of the ten items listed in the OECD Standard Rules is also specifically
required by the Statute, with the slight variation that only the most
recent annual financial statement (supplemented by a semi-annual statement if it is more than nine months old) is required.7" A further minor
exception is that only the name or trade name, legal form, domicile, and
equity capital of the persons described in the fourth item are specifically
required. 3
Moreover, the Statute specifically requires that the prospectus describe "the prerequisites and conditions under which the holders of the
shares may demand the payment of the portion of the fund which is
allocable to the share as well as the offices authorized for such purposes." 7 The prospectus must also contain "an explanation of the right
of the purchaser to rescind" in addition to "an express statement that
the foreign investment company is not subject to governmental supervision by a German agency.75
The absence of the tenth item from the requirements of the German
statute is obviated by the fact that the sales price and the price of
redemption of the foreign-based mutual fund shares must be published
continuously at least once a week in the Bundesanzieger and daily in a
newspaper of general circulation identified in the prospectus and having
a place of publication within the geographical area of the distribution
of the shares.7" The apparent" omission of the sixth item, while seemingly of only marginal importance, becomes substantially significant,
however, when viewed against the comment of the OECD Committee
of Financial Market that it "intended to help reveal conflicts of interests
and other details of the portfolio managers' and investment advisers'
"'1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3(2) (translation by this writer). Less literally,
BROCHER & PULCH, supra note 3, at 19 translates the phrase as "all information which is of
material importance for judging the foreign investment shares ... "
711969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute §§ 3, 4(l)(1). Certified financial reports for the past
three years are to be submitted to the Federal Supervisory Office. Regs. of Aug. 26, 1969, para.
4.1, see note 60 supra.
11l969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3(2) (1).
741d. § 3(2)(6).
71Id. § 3(2). Specific language that will satisfy these latter two requirements is contained in paras.
15.10 and 15.9 respectively of Regs. of Aug. 26, 1969.
u1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 4(l)(3).
"To the extent that such information is "of substantial meaning in the judgment of the foreign
investment shares" it is of course subject to that general requirement. See pp. 228-29 supra.
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activities." The omisssion is perhaps not surprising since conflicts of
interest affecting the activities on behalf of the mutual fund by the
management fund or its investment advisers are completely unregulated
by the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute."
The information in the prospectus logically most important to the
average investor ° will be the description of the general aims and objectives"1 of the fund. The investor must be cognizant of whether the fund
is, among other things, a growth fund, an income fund, a growth-income
fund, an aggressive growth fund, or a balanced fund. The requirements
of the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute are rather general in this
respect, 2 but are roughly similar to the requirements of § 8(b)(1)-(3) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940.83 It seems clear that a prospectus description meeting the requirement of the Investment Company
Act and the Securities Act of 1933 in this respect would also pass muster
under the German laws and regulations. 4
B.

Size of the Sales Commission Charged
The drafters of the OECD Standard Rules, unwilling "to formulate
a rule limiting the amount of . . .[management] fees and [sales and
redemption] charges," required only that "the participating investor
should be in a position, however, to find out how much he is paying and
for what." ' The 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute is consistent
"OECD Standard Rules 24.
"The 23rd Standard Rule, OECD Standard Rules 39-40, deals strictly with conflict of interest
situations, prohibiting transactions between the mutual fund and certain other persons unless
specific exemption is granted by the supervising authority. See p. 243, infra.
"ln actuality, the investor will undoubtedly base his judgment of the fund and the appropriateness of his investment in it on a myriad of logically relevant or irrelevant factors-such as the wordof-mouth reputation of the fund's management and, perhaps most of all, the persuasive ability of
the selling agent. Little scientific study has been made of the relative importance of all these
factors-thus the regulating authorities have little more than their own intuition and experience
on which to base requirements for and limitations upon information that may be communicated
to the investor.
"'OECD Standard Rules 23 (2d Rule). See p. 228 supra.
"The 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3 (2)(3) requires that the prospectus describe
"the assets which may be acquired for the fund, the principles pursuant to which they are selected,
whether only securities listed on stock exchanges will be acquired ...,how the earnings of the
fund are used and, whether, and if applicable within which limits a part of the fund is held [as
uninvested liquidity] in bank accounts."
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1)-(3) (1970).
4
For a tentatively contrary view see Note, West German Regulation of Foreign Mutual Fund
Distributions, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 323, 327 (1970).
"OECD Standard Rules 24-25. As previously noted the 4th Rule requires that this be "fully
explained in the prospectus." Id.
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with this view, operating apparently on the assumption that disclosure86
will enable this factor to be controlled by the forces of competition.
Domestic mutual fund sales commissions and fees are likewise unregulated, but apparently have averaged about 3.5 percent of the net asset
value per share,8" whereas foreign-based funds, such as the IOS International Investment Trust, have charged commissions in West Germany
of up to 8.5 percent, an amount equal to approximately 9.3 percent of
the amount actually invested." No fiduciary or other duty which might
prevent excessive sales loads is imposed on the management of foreignbased funds.89
Recent experience in the United States is very relevant here. Prior to
the 1970 amendments, § 22(b) of the Investment Company Act prohibited sales loads or commission charges which were "unconscionable or
grossly excessive." 90 This section now requires that the public offering
price of investment company securities "shall not include an excessive
sales load but shall allow for reasonable compensation ....
The Securities and Exchange Commission's initial proposal in this
respect would have limited sales commissions to five percent92 of the
amount invested, in contrast to the generally prevailing rate of 9.3
percent. A version submitted in the House of Representatives would
have created a presumption that the sales charge was fair and equitable
if it had been approved within a year by a two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares and all of the unaffiliated directors.13 This is not the
place to discuss in detail the relative merits of these different control
standards, nor even to outline the abuses or potential abuses which made
the 1970 changes appropriate. 4 It is sufficient for present purposes to
"Required by 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3(2)(5).
07

TORMANN, supra note 2, at 26.
PAGE & HODGSON, supra note I, at 196. The lIT commission scaled down to 2.5 percent

"RAW,

on single investments of $1 million or more. Id.
"9Nor are excessive sales loads dealt with in the 1957 Investment Company Statute. Section 10(l)
of that Statute requires the domestic fund asset's to be managed "with the diligence of a conscientious businessman and to protect . . . [the unit holders'] interests." A mutual fund manager
allowing, to himself or to others, an excessive sales load would arguably not be protecting the unit
holder's interests.
1015 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1970).
1'15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)(I) (1970). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) bears
"the initial responsibility for prescribing rules to assure that the public does not pay excessive sales
loads . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
11H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1970).
"Id. 61.
"4 For the Security and Exchange Commission's study and analysis of the problems which made
the Investment Company Act of 1970 amendments necessary see its "Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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note the widely divergent views in the United States with respect to what
is an appropriate method of regulation in this area, with the United
States views based on a presumption that regulation is appropriate, as
against the absence of any regulatory control in West Germany.
C.

"Front-end Loading"

The laissez-faire attitude which has been assumed with respect to the
size of sales commissions does not carry over into the area of the distribution of sales charges over a period of time with respect to investment
plans requiring regular periodic payments. Here, again, the debate in
respect to the 1970 amendments of the Investment Company Act of
1940 serves to illustrate the problem.
Section 27(a) of the Investment Company Act of 19401 specifically
limits the sales load to nine percent of the total payments to be made
on a periodic payment plan and requires that no more than one-half of
the first twelve monthly payments be applied to this sales load, that the
portion of the sales load deducted from the first twelve payments be
deducted evenly from those payments, and that the remaining portion
of the total sales load be deducted evenly from the remaining payments.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in its "Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth," recommended the abolition
of the front-end loading practice." In the words of the Senate Report
on the 1970 amendment proposals:
It is of course obvious that such an arrangement is usually detrimental to the investor, particularly if for any reason he discontinues his
payments at an early date. Unless the stock market rises rapidly, he
is almost certain to lose money.97
On the other hand, the House Report expressed the view that "the
1115 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (1970).
"See H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1966). For the SEC's basis for this recommendation see id. at 223-250.
'IS. REP. No. 184, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss. (1970). The report continues:
Contractural plans are sold to investors in lower economic strata who are not as
sophisticated as those who purchase ordinary mutual fund shares. They are usually sold
on a door-to-door basis with purchasers being solicited in their homes and offices. While
the front-end load feature is fully disclosed, in the prospectus, a survey made several
years ago indicates that a few months after the purchase many investors did not realize
that they were paying such a load. In addition, if an investor is to avoid paying what is
by any standard an excessive sales charge, he must be able to forecast his ability to
continue his payments over a period of several years. Studies have shown that few small
investors have been able to achieve this result. Consequently, over half of all contractural
plan investors fail to complete their payments on schedule and thus usually pay excessive
sales charges.
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practice of front-end loading is a significant and necessary sales incentive both to the salesmen and to their principals and underwriters." 98
The Congressional balancing of these two interests was an attempt
to put teeth into the disclosure provisions through the requirement that
during the first eighteen months after a front-end loaded plan is sold to
an investor he is entitled to, and is to be separately and specifically
advised of this opportunity if he has missed payments,9 9 redeem his
interest and receive its net asset value, plus the excess of any sales load
that he has paid over 15 percent of his total payments to date., ° Alternatively, the fund can avoid such refunds by electing to limit its front-end
load to an upper limit of 20 percent of any payment and to a maximum
average of 16 percent over the first four years.' 01 Upon the sale of any
periodic payment plan having a front-end load, especially when the sales
load deducted exceeds nine percent of any payment, the plan's custodial
bank, within sixty days of the consummation of the sale, must notify
the buyer as to the commission amounts to be deducted from each
payment. The buyer then has 45 days within which to rescind and receive repayment of all commissions paid plus the net asset value of his
investment to that date. 02
The OECD Standard Rules place no limit on front-end loading while
the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute adopts a limitation proportionately stricter than the original American one in that no more than
one-third of the individual's first year's payments can be applied to
selling costs and expenses and the remaining costs must be deducted at
a flat rate from the remaining payments." 3 The legislative history
states:
A further limitation or a prohibition does not seem sensible, since
distribution by agents, who have been largely responsible everywhere
for the favorable expansion of investment in mutual funds, is possible
only if a larger share of the total costs is charged at the beginning. 04
The shift of the American mutual fund industry to an emphasis on
no-load funds with no sales commissions casts considerable doubt on the
11H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
"Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(e) (1970).
IId. § 27(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(d)-(f) (1970).
'"lId. § 27(g)-(h), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(g)-(h) (1970).
2
1. 1d. § 27(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(f) (1970). See notes 113 and 114, infra and accompanying text.
1011969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(c). The effect of this provision forced lOS to
cut its front-end load when selling periodic payment plans in Germany from 50% to 33 1/3% of
the first year's payments.
"'lBROCHER & PULCH, supra note 3, at 65.
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need for front-end loading as an incentive to the distribution of the fund.
It is to the general advantage of the investor that his mutual fund,
through sufficiently wide distribution, be of adequate asset size to
achieve the diversification of investment necessary to its purpose of risk
spreading. -However, the history of the selling of periodic payment programs is so tarnished in both West Germany and the United States it
would seem that very little emphasis justifiably could be placed on the
encouragement of the type of sales techniques which seem to go along
with front-end loading. Most definitely, even the strict limitation of the
rate at which the mutual fund salesman can consume his slice of the
investor's pie contained in the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute
can have little actual protective effect if the size of that slice remains
unlimited.
D.

Buyer's Right of Rescission

The OECD Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares
Statute are more effective in defending the investor against highpressure persuasion than the Investment Company Act of 1940 in one
specific area of what might be described as overenthusiastic sales tactics.
Both the 33rd Standard Rule 0 5 and § 11 of the Statute' ° afford the
buyer of the mutual fund shares a right to change his mind and rescind
the purchase within a short time period if he purchased the shares as a
result of a door-to-door sales campaign. The Standard Rule provision
is expressed conditionally, in that it states that "door-to-door sales shall
only be permitted" if the rescission right exists for a period of "at least
seven days after . . . [the purchaser] has signed an indication of his

intention to purchase."'' 7 The right to rescission under the German
statute exists only when the buyer "has been induced to give a statement
of purchase through oral negotiations outside of the permanent place
of business of the seller,"'0 8 or when the seller "has no permanent place
of business," and when the purchase of the foreign-based mutual fund
is not with the scope of the buyer's business and the sales call is not in
pursuance of a preceding request from the buyer. 00 This time period,
however, is two weeks from the date of delivery of the sales prospec0
tus.''
'°OECD Standard Rules 50.
011969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § II.
I"7OECD Standard Rules 50.
1011969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 11(1).
-- Id. § 11(3).
"Old. § 11(l)-(2).
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The German Statute, by making specific reference to § 55(1)' of the
German Trade Law, incorporates the traditional European prejudice
against unsolicited door-to-door sales but excepts from these rescission
provisions sales in response to a "preceeding request.""' Little can be
said intuitively or empirically, to support any contention that door-todoor sales are not specifically apt to result from unfair or deceptive sales
techniques. However, since the Statute only requires that this right to
rescission be revealed to the investor in the text of the prospectus" 3 and
the OECD Standard Rules do not make any provision with respect to
the manner in which, if at all, this right is to be revealed, it seems likely
that the deceived investor can be specially deceived about this feature
of his investment as well. This may be especially true if he has only seven
days to two weeks in which to become undeceived. In contrast the
special notice provisions and the lengthy period in which rescission is
available," 4 and particularly those in respect to heavily front-end loaded
plans,"' as presented in the rescission rights introduced in respect to
front-end load periodic payment plans by the 1970 amendments to the
Investment Company Act of 1940, appears so effective that Congress
"'West German Trade Law (Gewerbeordnung) §§55-64, regulates door-to-door sales generally.
In most cases sales licenses are required and certain practices are forbidden. Securities sales may
be permitted under regulations adopted by the Federal Minister for Commerce or by the individual
state (Linder) governments. Id. §§ 56(l)(1)h, 56(2).
"'A realization of the need for remedial practices in connection with door-to-door sales generally
is working its way into United States law. In several recent cases, e.g., Time, Inc., CCH TRADE
REG. REP.
19, 564 (FTC Docket No. C-1918), Perfect Film & Chem. Corp., CCH TRADE REG.
REP.
19,565 (FTC Docket No. C-1919), Neighborhood Periodicals, Inc., CCH TRADE REG.
REP.
20,013 (F.T.C. file No. 712 3118), the Federal Trade Commission has required that
sales contracts contain a cooling-off period when the seller has allegedly used unfair and deceptive
practices in connection with door-to-door sales.
"1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3. See note 75, supra.
'Section 27(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(f) (1970), as
amended by the 1970 Act required that "With respect to any periodic payment plan, the custodian
bank . . . shull mail to each certificate holder, within sixty days after the issuance of the certificate,
a statement of charges to be deducted from the projected payments on the certificate and a notice
of his right of withdrawal.
... Within 45 days after receipt of this notice the certificate holder
could surrender his certificate for the net asset value of his account plus the difference "between
the gross payments made and the net amount invested" i.e., the entire commission charged. '1
U.S.C.A. § 80a-27(f) (Supp. 1, 1973), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(f) (1970), limits rescission to
periodic payment plans "(other than a plan under which the amount of the sales load deducted
from any payment thereon does not exceed 9 percentum of any payment)."
"'In heavily front-end loaded plans (from 20% to 50% of any first year payment or averaging
over 16% of the payments during the first four years) the rescission period extends to 18 months
and special notification of this must be made when payments are missed. Investment Company
Act of 1940 § 27(d)-(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(d)-(e) (1970). The commission refund is, however, only
the excess commission over 15% of the payments made.
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soon provided some relief." 8 If the American investor reads his mail he
will be alerted to the loading feature and will have some leisure in which
to reconsider his decision.
The OECD Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares
Statute apparently are basically consistent with the Investment Company Act of 1940 once the right of rescission is exercised. All three
schemes require the refunding to the investor of the net asset value of
his interest either at the time of the rescission or at the time notice of
the rescission is received by the fund."' Thus, if the fund being sold is
open-end, as it must be if it is to be subject to either the Standard Rules
or the German Statute,"' the significant factor in these rescission rights,
based on investors' having second thoughts, is the refund of all or part
of the sales commissions charged. The investor is afforded no incentive
to wait out the rescission rights period in order to determine how the
fund has performed and exercise his right as a "put" if the net asset
value drops."' Similarly this rescission right would be moot if the fund
is both open end and no-load.
VI.
A.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MUTUAL FUND

Entity Form

It has been pointed out above in respect to the definitional focus of
the OECD Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares
Statute'20 that neither regulatory structure discriminates against or favors any specific entity form with respect to the mutual fund itself or
its management. This seems appropriate provided that substantially
identical investor protections and rights are present. While the corpo"'See note 114 supra.
"'OECD Standard Rules 50 (33rd) Rule, 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 11(4),
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(d)-(f) (1970). The German law
states that the value is to be that determined on the day after receipt of the notice of rescission,
whereas § 27(d) and (f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 do not specifically refer to the
time of the computation of value. The OECD Standard Rules state that value as of either the time
of giving notice or of its receipt is proper.
"'See p. 226 supra.
"'The legislative history of the German provision states that:
This regulatory scheme seems necessary and appropriate, since otherwise market
losses would go to the detriment of the assets of the fund and thereby to the detriment
of the remaining shareholders, while, in the case of a rise in value, the buyer is always
free not to rescind but rather to demand redemption of shares on return for the ...
[net asset value] (although without [recovery of] the costs paid." BR(7CHER & PULCH,
supra note 3, at 83.
"'See p. 242 supra.
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rate fund form will provide traditional corporate law mechanisms for
the protection of its investor-shareholders, the presence of similar protections when the mutual fund is the product of purely a managerialcustodial arrangement between the fund investors and its managers will
depend both upon the terms of the specific arrangement and the extent
to which the governing law system applies traditional fiduciary law
concepts to the arrangement, thereby treating it as a trust relation21
ship.1
It is, of course, appropriate for the regulating jurisdiction to impose
minimum requirements on this relationship thereby affording the investor some control over certain changes in the operation or status of the
fund. This is the approach utilized by all three of the regulatory schemes
examined here. But here the attempt of the OECD Standard Rules to
establish standards is clearly minimal. The Standard Rules provide only
that assets or titles to assets of the mutual fund "shall be held in a
manner acceptable to the supervisory authority"' 22 and that either the
supervisory authority or the participating investors have the power to
approve changes in the "general aims and objectives" of the fund, 23 the
pssignment of a management contract, 4 or "a change in management."' 25 This approach is at its most sophisticated level in the Investment Company Act of 1940 as it deals with investor control and protection.
B.

Control by Shareholders

Fundamentally, the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires in
§ 18(i) that "every share of stock . . . issued by a registered investment
company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with
every other outstanding voting stock." 126 Directors of the registered
investment company are to be elected by the holders of the outstanding
voting securities, except that vacancies of up to one-third of the board
can be filled "in any otherwise legal manner."'' 2 7 The Act also provides
that two important matters must be approved by a vote of a majority
"'As previously noted, supra at note 51, the domestic mutual fund is of the contractual type
under West German law. The management company's duty in respect to it is set out principally in
§ 10 of the 1957 Investment Shares Statute. See p. 242 infra.
"OECD Standard Rules 36 (18th Rule).
"OECD Standard Rules 22 (Ist Rule).
"'OECD Standard Rules 37 (20th Rule).
"'OECDStandard Rules 38 (21st Rule).
"'15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1970).
'15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1970).
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(manageof the outstanding voting securities: the investment advisory
129
ment) contract 28 and change in its investment policies.
The 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act of 1940 substantially clarified the shareholders' control over investment policy
changes by requiring that in its registration statement, and in addition
to the itemization of policies required by § 8(b)(1), 131 the investment
company recite both "all [other] investment policies . . .which are
changeable only if authorized by shareholder vote"'' and "all [other]
policies of the registrant . . . in respect of matters which the registrant
32
Section 13(a)(3)13
deems to be matters of fundamental policy."'
now makes it clear that the investment company cannot deviate without
shareholder approval in respect to either category. Prior to this amendment §§ 8(b)(2) and 13(a)(3) covered only fundamental policy and there
existed some doubt as to whether the language covered unitemized matters of investment policy not voluntarily labeled "fundamental" by the
34
fund.1
It is significant to note that, in applying the specific contractual term
requirements § 2(4) of the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute, the
German Federal Supervisory Office for Credit Affairs has apparently
followed the Securities and Exchange Commission's usage 35 of "fundamental policy" by requiring that United States funds qtialifying for sale
in West Germany comply with the provision that certain of the "contractural conditions" contained in that section "be adopted as 'fundamental policy' of the fund or otherwise be treated so that it cannot be
changed without shareholder vote."'' 31 Specifically these matters of fundamental policy are: that the shareholder can require redemption of his
-interest in the fund;'37 that the fund will not acquire securities issued in
another investment company;' 38 that securities or other assets in the
'115 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
1"15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1970).
'115 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1) (1970).
'13l5 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (2) (1970).
13115 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (3) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1970).
'34H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1970); Green v. Brown, 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1968).
"See Investment Company Act Release No. 5565 (December 20, 1968).
'Memorandum of Robert L. Augenblick, President, Investment Company Institute, to members of the ICI, No. 70-71, September 27, 1971, at 3 [hereinafter cited as ICI MEMO]. Since these
restrictions are required conditions to distribution in Germany, a shareholder vote changing them
would presumably result in a stop order from the Supervisory Office.
'171969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(b); ICI MEMO., supra note 136, at 5.
'1l969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(d); ICI MEMO., supra note 136, at 6.
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fund's portfolio shall not be pledged;' 3 9 that only in special cases can
the fund borrow and then only short term in an amount equal to no
more than 10 percent of its assets (in which case assets equal to the loan
amount may be pledged); 40 and that the fund not engage in selling
short.'
Other than these provisions, the German Statute does not force shareholder approval upon any changes in fund organization, policies, or
management. The foreign-based mutual fund must obligate itself to the
notification of the Federal Supervisory Office as to "material changes
of circumstances" reported in its notification to the Office of its intention to distribute shares in West Germany,' but there is no requirement
that such changes be reported to the shareholder-investor.4 I While the
by-laws or management regulations of a domestic West German mutual
fund are not subject to shareholder-investor approval, they must be
specifically approved by the Federal Supervisory Office' according to
specific standards. 4 The Supervisory Office exercises no such control
over foreign-based funds and, if not restricted by the law of the jurisdiction in which the fund has been organized, marked changes in investment policy and other matters are conceivable and beyond control.
While the OECD Standard Rules do not require that any matters in
respect to a fund be submitted for shareholder-investor approval, this
alternative to approval by the supervisory authority, or a trustee in one
instance, is offered in the three situations of change in investment policy,
assignment of the management contract, and change in management.'
C.

Existence and Rights of Different Classes of Securities or Debt.

Since neither the OECD Standard Rules nor the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute specifically requires any shareholder control, in
turn neither contains any voting rights requirement similar to § 18(i) 47
of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Neither contemplates nor
prohibits different classes of equity securities with different claims or
'111969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(e); ICI MEMO., supra note 136, at 7.
11969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(g); ICI MEMO., supra note 136, at 8.
"11969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 7(2)(6)(b).
"'See id. § 4 for a description of the information which the fund must publish in West Germany
and when and where it must be published.
"1957 Investment Company Statute § 15 (2).
"'d. § 15(3).
"'See p. 237 supra.
"I5 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1970).
"75 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (1970).
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rights. In contrast § 18(f) of the '40 Act prohibits a United States
registered open-end investment company from issuing any class of senior securities except in "series companies" in which a series or class may
be preferred in respect to certain assets allocated to it.' Thus, fund
sponsors under either regulatory scheme are theoretically free to create
and own a preferred class of securities entitled to, for example, a disproportionately large allocation of any fund gains together with a disproportionately small share of any losses.'
Both the OECD Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign Investment
Shares Statute place strict limitations on debt issuance by a mutual
fund. The German Statute requires that the fund prohibit itself from
borrowing more than an amount equal to 10 percent of the fund's asset
value and from borrowing anything at all except in "special cases."' 150
The legislative history states that borrowing is thus to be permitted only
when "the borrowing is not made for the purpose of speculation" and
"particularly in consideration of the cases in which the investment company is faced with massive demands for redemption which it can meet
without damage to the fund only if it provides itself with the requisite
cash only by borrowing rather than by selling securities under unfavora' 57
ble conditions.'
The Standard Rules limit the amount to be borrowed to 20 percent
of the fund's total assets.'52 If the borrowing is for redemption purposes
it is considered "as being in the nature of an exceptional or emergency
measure"' 53 and "the money so borrowed shall be repaid within a brief
period of time satisfactory to the regulatory authority."'5 4 If the borrowing is for the purpose of leverage it is to be reduced immediately if the
decline in the market value of the fund assets brings it above the 20
percent ceiling, thereby substantially limiting the use of long-term debt.
The majority of the OECD experts were opposed to permitting any
54
borrowing whatsoever.' '1
"'This would be the equivalent of an "upside only" incentive or performance management fee
now forbidden in respect to the management of United States investment companies by § 205 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970).
"'1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4) (e), (f).
1"1BROCHER & PULCH, supra note 3, at 67.
" OECD Standard Rules 32 (14th Rule).
'1d. at 32.
4
' Id. at 33.
"' 'Id. at 32.
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INVESTMENT OPERATIONS OF THE MUTUAL FUND

Valuation of Shares

It has been observed above that under the 1969 Foreign Investment
Shares Statute the fund is required to publish continuously on a daily
basis the sales and redemption price of fund units. 55 The OECD Standard Rules require that the sales prospectus state the frequency with
which the net asset value, the sales price, and the redemption price are
to be calculated,'56 and that these values be calculated "reasonably frequently, but at least once a month."' 57
While the German Statute contains no criteria with respect to the
manner in which the asset value and the unit net asset value are to be
determined, the OECD Standard Rules require that the method and
procedure for valuation be both satisfactory to the supervisory authority
and set out clearly in the prospectus.'58 The comments on this Rule
suggest that it is a "sound and recommendable practice to value at the
price of the latest transaction which took place on a securities exchange
or at the latest bid price, securities . . . for which market quotations
are readily available and to value any other securities at a fair price
determined in good faith by the board of directors" of the fund.' 59 The
fact that annual reports submitted to the Supervisory Office by funds
being sold in Germany must be certified by a certified public accountant, or his equivalent, 6 " seems to indicate that at least this annual
valuation will be determined according to something akin to generally
accepted accounting principles and will meet the requirement of the
Standard Rules that "compliance of valuation with such [announced]
methods and procedures [of asset valuation] shall be verified periodically by an independent auditor."''
Valuation of untraded or restricted securities and of real estate has
been a substantial problem, both in the United States6 2 and with respect
to offshore funds. 6 3 The incentive for overvaluation is found principally
in the enhancement of the fund's performance record, most particularly
"See p. 229 supra.
"See p. 228 supra.
"'OECD Standard Rules 42 (25th Rule).
'OECD Standard Rules 37 (19th Rule).
"'Id.at 37.
8'1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 7(6) (a).
.. OECD Standard Rules 37 (19th rule).
"'See, e.g., Mates Financial Services, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8836, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 258 (Mar. 9, 1970), CCH SEC. REG. REP.
77,790.
"'See, e.g., RAW, PAGE & HODGSON, supra note 2, at 294-301.
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if part of the management fee is based on fund performance. Its most
serious effect, however, is a long-term effect upon investors who remain
in the fund after an excessive upward valuation or new investors who
participate in reliance on it. Very substantial opportunities for manipulation are presented by this situation.
The suggestion from the comments on the OECD Standard Rule is
taken directly from § 2(a)(41) of the Investment Company Act which
requires that where market quotations on a portfolio investment are not
readily available, the fair value of these securities or assets are to be
determined "in good faith by the board of directors."' 64 This seems
perhaps the most significant and important fiduciary-type duty which
can be placed upon the persons in control of the management of a
mutual fund.
B.

Independence of Management

Neither the OECD Standard Rules nor the 1969 Foreign Investment
Shares Statute require the creation of any general or specific fiduciary
duty owed by the fund management to the investors. Except in certain
instances when the supervisory authority or a custodian bank may become involved, control of this nature is left to other provisions of the
law of the jurisdiction in which the fund is organized and may be totally
lacking if the relationship between the investor and the fund managers
is purely contractual." 5
The omission from the West German Statute of any requirement of
independent management supervision is particularly striking in view of
the substantial supervision which the Federal Supervisory Office for
Credit Affairs itself undertakes in respect to the management of domestic mutual funds.' Not only is a fiduciary duty to the investors specifically imposed'67 and a supervisory board of directors [A ufsichtsrat] specifically required,6 8 but the Supervisory Office must pass upon both the
reputation and expertise of the members of the board.'6 9
The usage of the Aufsichtsrat in German corporate law bears some
similarity to the United States requirement that at least 40 percent of
the members of the board of directors of a registered investment com16415 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(A), (B) (1970).
"'See pp. 236-37 supra.
'"See pp. 223-24, 226-27 supra.
1671957 Investment Company Statute § 10 (1).
18Id. § 3.
'-Id. § 4(I).

1973]

REGULATING COLLECTIVE

INVESTMENT

pany, except a no-load open-end fund,' 7 be persons who are not "interested persons" as defined under the Act.' Members of this supervisory
board are required to have some independence in that they cannot be
otherwise employed by the corporation which they supervise, or be
members of its management board (Vorstand).'7
The OECD Standard Rules regulate conflict of interest situations and
self-dealing in a manner strikingly similar to § 17 of the Investment Act
of 1940.'" The Standard Rules prohibit transactions "directly or indirectly" between certain persons and "the. . .[fund] itself, the management company or the distribution company which involve the buying or
selling of securities for their own account, or the granting or receiving
of loans for their own account" unless "the supervisory authority agrees
that the interests of the participating investors . . . are not prejudiced
thereby.'1 71 Persons subject to this prohibition are directors, officers and
employees of the fund and the families of these individuals, the fund's
trustee, its management company and distribution company, 10 percent
voting shareholders in the fund or any of these companies, and "all
persons who through affiliation are liable to come directly or indirectly
under the influence of the above,"'' 75 a provision which would presumably include comanaged funds. While the differences are not of crucial
significance, the class of persons subject to the Standard Rules is more
closely that of the more extensive class of "interested persons" as that
' 77
term is used in the amended '40 Act 71 than that of "affiliated person,' 1
though it is the latter that is subject to the § 17 conflict restrictions of
the '40 Act. The transactional coverage is coextensive with § 17(a) 7 ;
the broader coverage of § 17(d) and (e) 71 is not present.
C.

Characterof Investments and Investment Policy
The regulation of the disclosure of investment policy by the OECD
Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign Shares Statute' and encum7

' lnvestment Company Act of 1940 § 10(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1970).
'Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970). For the definition
of "interested persons" see id. § 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
'See Stock Company Law of September 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI III 4121-1 §§ 95-116, 100, 105(l)
[Aktiengesetz].
315 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1970).
'OECD Standard Rules 39 (23rd Rule).
1111d. 40.
'"15 U.S.C. § 80a-(2)(a) (19) (1970).
"15 U.S.C. § 80a-(2) (a) (3) (1970).
"'I5U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970).
7'15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d), (e) (1970).
"See p. 230 supra.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 3: 215

brances on changes in that policys' have been discussed above. Both
regulatory schemes, however, place distinct restrictions on investment
policy by prohibiting or limiting certain investment strategies and concentrations. For example, both prohibit short selling."8 2 The Standard
Rules severely restrict leveraging, 183 whereas the German Statute appears to prohibit it in respect to securities. 184 Neither scheme requires
that the fund limit itself to listed or publicly-traded securities. Both
permit trading in put and call options, i.e., hedging, but the Standard
Rules specifically prohibit a fund from incurring the liability inherent
in writing call options on securities it does not own,185 a risk similar to
that present in short selling. 88 As previously noted, the OECD Standard
Rules do not cover real estate funds, whereas the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute does.' 87
A matter of special interest is that both regulatory schemes restrict
investment by the fund in other mutual funds, the OECD Standard
Rules by prohibiting a fund from selling its shares "if it is aware that
the buyer is another. . .[fund] and that the sale would cause the buying
• . .[fund], either individually or with other . . .[funds] belonging to
the same group, to become the holder of more than 5 to 15% of the
shares of the selling. . .[fund]"' 8 and the 1969 Foreign Shares Statute
by adopting the 1957 Investment Company Statute's prohibition on the
acquisition of shares in another fund.8 9 Parallels to both controls may
be found in § 12(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The
parallel to the German Statute is found in the original § 12(d)(l) of the
'40 Act, which prohibited a registered investment company from acquiring "more than 3 percent of the outstanding voting stock of another
investment company unless it already owned 25 percent or more of such
stock."'' 0 The parallel to the OECD Standard Rule is found in
"'See pp. 238-39 supra.
' 2OECD Standard Rules 31 (13th Rule); 1969 Investment Shares Statute § 2(4) (g).
'"OECD Standard Rules 32 (14th Rule); see p. 240 supra.
'11969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(e), (f); see pp. 239-40 supra. But note that real
estate may be leveraged under certain circumstances. Id. § 2(4) (f).
'OECD Standard Rules 33 (15th Rule).
lAnd a transaction which might fit under the specific language of § 2(4)(g) of the 1969 Foreign
Investment Shares Statute prohibiting short sales of any assets.
'See pp. 225-26 supra.
"'OECD Standard Rules 30 (11 th Rule). The buying fund also is prohibited, by the 9th Rule,
from acquiring more than 5 to 15 percent of the voting securities of any one issuer, including
another fund. Id. 28.
"1l969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4)(d) referring to 1957 Investment Company
Statute § 7(6) [now § 8(6)].
'"See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970); This section is basically 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-12(d) (I) (A) (1970).

1973]

REGULATING

COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT

245

§ 12(d)(l)(B) of the '40 Act as amended in 1970, which makes it "unlawful for a registered open end company, its principal underwriter or
any broker-dealer registered under the Securities Act of 1934 to sell or
otherwise dispose of a security issued by a registered investment company if, as a result of the transaction and to the knowledge of the seller,
the [ownership] limitations in that subparagraph would be exceeded."''
These provisions of § 12(d)(1)(B) and the companion provisions of
§ 12(d)(l)(C) and (F) were added to the '40 Act specifically to deal with
problems inherent in the creation of "several unregistered foreign-based
fundholding companies investing primarily in the securities of American
mutual funds,"' 9 2 specifically the lOS-created Fund of Funds, Ltd.
Since the restrictions of § 12(d)(l) had previously dealt only with
purchases by registered investment companies and the Fund of Funds
was not and could not be registered,' the additional control was
93
thought necessary.'
D.

Size and Computation of Management Fees

The charging of allegedly excessive management fees, particularly in
the case of large mutual funds when the fee is a percentage of the assets
under management and does not take into account management economics of scale, has been the source of much recent litigation in the
United States.'94 Prior to the 1970 amendments, however, the duty of
the mutual fund manager to the fund and the standards by which fees
were measured were unclear and inadequate. Section 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 required a showing of "gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust,"' 95 i.e., that the fee "shocked the conscience of
the court."'9 9 After some differences of opinion about whether, for example, excessive management fees could be controlled if the approval
of the management contract by a majority of the unaffiliated directors
and the shareholders were required,'97 Congress promulgated standards
which contemplate "a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct"'9 8 and explicitly provide that "the investment adviser of a
"'15 U.S.C. § 80a-l2(d)(I)(B) (1970) (emphasis added).
111l5 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(l)(B), (C), (F) (1970).
"'See RAW, PAGE & HODGSON, supra note 1,at 85-88.
"'See, e.g., Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A2d 602 (Del.
Chancery 1962); see generally Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation - New Frontiers for
the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 73 (1962).
"15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
"'See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
'"See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
"'Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(5)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970).
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registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty
with respect to the receipt of compensation for services,"' 9 9 but that
while it is unnecessary to show "personal misconduct" in respect to
breach of this fiduciary duty, "the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving a breach." 2 0
As has been stated above,210 no such fiduciary standard is available
to the investor under either the OECD Standard Rules or the German
1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute, nor does either scheme impose
any requirement of periodic review and approval of the terms of the
management or investment advice contracts as is done by § 15(a) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940.02 Besides requiring the disclosure of
the terms of the management contract in the sales prospectus, 20 3 the
OECD Standard Rules require generally only that the management
agreement be in writing, that it "contain details concerning the services
to be rendered and the payments to be received . . .," and that its
assignment be subject to prior approval.0 4 The 1969 Foreign Investment
Shares Statute requires only that the prospectus contain a description
of the compensation and expenses to be paid to other parties out of the
fund. 205
The OECD Standard Rules afford a certain amount of attention to
the problems inherent in performance or incentive management fees by
the requirement that such fees "be permitted only subject to close scrutiny by the supervisory authority as to their reasonableness, their
method of calculation and the identity of those against whom they are
charged.1 200 There is no suggestion, as is found in United States law,
that an investment advisory fee which increases with capital gains or
capital appreciation but which does not decrease with losses or depreciation is unreasonable, 07 "a 'heads I win, tails you lose' " situation. 2 The
OECD Standard Rule comments only point out that while incentive or
9

id. § 3(5)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
d. § 3(5)(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1) (1970). Approval by the Board of Directors shall
be given "such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances."
Id. § 35 (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1970).
""See pp. 236-37, 241-42 supra.
215 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1970).
20
See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
'"4OECD Standard Rules 37 (20th Rule); see p. 237 supra.
11969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 3(2)(5).
2
OECD Standard Rules 39 (22nd Rule).
'ilnvestment Advisers Act of 1940 § 5, 15 U.S.C. 80b-5 (1970), now prohibits such incentive
agreements with a registered investment company.
2
"See S. REP. 184, 91st. Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1970).
200
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performance fees might be "well earned" they also "might tempt the
management . . . (which could not share in any resulting losses) to
accept unwarranted risks" and "should therefore never be excessive lest
they involve the management in a conflict of interest."' "9
VIII.

REDEMPTION OR SALE (BY THE INVESTOR) OF MUTUAL FUND
SHARES

A.

Right of Redemption

The OECD Standard Rules definitionally2t ° and the 1969 Foreign
Investment Shares Statute as a matter of "fundamental policy'',, exclude closed-end funds, except that a closed-end fund which provides
directly or indirectly, for redemption of its shares would be clearly
permissible under the Standard Rules112 and perhaps allowable under
the German Statute.
The OECD Standard Rules comments describe the right of redemption as an "essential feature ' 2 t3 of a mutual fund and the legislative
history of the German Statute notes that the open-end form "has proved
to be advantageous in comparison with the so-called closed-end form
because only in the case of the open-end form is it assured that the price
of the shares depends exclusively on the value of the assets of the fund
and is not additionally influenced by supply and demand relative to the
24
shares."
Redemption rights have in fact been a key focus of these two regulatory schemes. Redemption rights, by providing complete liquidity, offer
the ultimate safety exit for the investor, and perhaps the only exit if
rescission rights are either nonexistent or severely limited. 215 In many
instances the investor's only available influence upon or response to,
investment and managerial policies to which he objects will be to liquidate his investment.
For these reasons both the OECD Standard Rules and the 1969
Foreign Investment Shares Statute are detailed and explicit with respect
Standard Rules 39 (22nd Rule). See p. 243 supra.
"OECD Standard Rules 21.
2 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(4) (b); see note 137, supra and accompanying text.
2"1OECD
2

"'OECD
Standard Rules 22.
3
" id. at 43.
'BRJCHER & PULCH, supra note 3, at 65. Similarly domestic mutual funds in Germany must
be in the open end forum. Id. However, these requirements of the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares
Law do not apply if the fund is listed on a German stock exchange and is not otherwise publicly
offered. 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 1(2).
"'See pp. 225, 234 supra.
2
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to redemption requirements. The OECD Standard Rules require that
redemption be "at the option of the participating investor," that the
redemption price for all participating investors "equal the net asset
value per share . . ., less any redemption charge, calculated . . . the
last time before or the next time after the request for redemption is
received . . .," that "payment shall be made as soon as possible but in
any case not later than 5 to 30 days after receipt of the request for
redemption," and that "payment shall be made in cash in the currency
in which the. . . [fund's] assets are valued, unless redemption by means
of portfolio securities is expressly authorized by the supervisory authority as being not detrimental to either the redeeming or the remaining
participating investors." ' 6
Section 2(3) of the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute requires
that the foreign-based mutual fund appoint "one or more domestic
banks (Kreditinstitute) . . . as paying agents through which payments
made by, or designated for, the holders of the shares may be made" and
that "it must be assured" that amounts paid through these agents "are
passed on to the [fund's] bank of deposit [Depotbank] without undue
delay."" 7' The Federal Supervisory Office for Credit Affairs has reputedly been very strict in applying the requirement of "without undue
delay" requiring that transfers of investments into United States funds
be accomplished by telegraphic or other means on the same day that
the funds are received by the paying agent in West Germany. The
suggested contractual conditions which must be adopted as a matter of
"fundamental policy" if a United States fund is to be marketed in West
Germany, however, under normal conditions allow the fund seven days
from receipt of the redemption request in which to pay to the investor
in cash the net asset value of his interest."'
B.

Suspension of Rights of Redemption

The allowance by the German Supervisory Office of seven days in
which United States funds are to pay out funds on redemption is consistent with the requirement of § 22(e) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940,11 which in addition allows the fund to suspend redemption
"' OECD Standard Rules 43 (26th Rule).
2171969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(3). The Regulation of August 26, 1969, para. 14.1
requires confirmation by the paying agent that it assumes this function and will transfer funds
directly and without undue delay; and para. 13.2, that the route of payments from the paying agents
to the bank of deposit and vice versa be described in the fund's notification statement.
1"ICI MEMO., supra note 136, at 4, 5.
11115 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970).
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when the New York Stock Exchange is closed or trading thereon is
restricted or during certain other emergency conditions in which the
Securities and Exchange Commission deems suspension of redemption
necessary for the protection of the investors. The necessary contractual
condition requires Securities and Exchange Commission determination
of the existence of any of these conditions as does the '40 Act with the
exception of closing of the New York Stock Exchange. 2 0 The United
States law, however, explicitly requires that the seven day period run
from receipt of the request for redemption by the fund's agent, a requirement implicit in the German law.
Further, though the German position is to require a cash redemption
at all times, it is recognized that if a fund has filed an irrevocably
binding election under Rule 18f-1 of the Investment Company Act of
1940221 it may redeem the interest of any one investor with noncash
property when his requests for redemption over a 90-day period involve
an amount in excess of the lesser of $250,000 or one percent of the total
net asset value of the fund at the beginning of the period. 22 There are
in the German Statute no other conditions in which the fund could fail
to redeem its shares in cash.
The OECD Standard Rules require that redemption "shall not be
suspended unless exceptional circumstances prevail under which it is, in
particular, not reasonably practicable to ascertain the value of the assets
of the. . . [fund] or to dispose of them and unless the approval of such
suspension by the supervisory authority of the country where the...
[fund] is established has been obtained. 21 3 The comments to this rule
describe the exceptional circumstances "due to force majeure and suchlike" under which suspension of redemption rights might be appropriate, 22 4 but point out that "the idea that the redemption right should be
suspended only if a certain minimum percentage of the . . . [fund's]
assets is involved in the emergency or, in other words, if at least X
percent of the portfolio securities cannot be valued or sold [had been]
rejected as too rigid. 2 2 5
The suspension of redemption in cash is obviously necessary when the
assets of the mutual fund cannot be sold, i.e., when the usual securities
markets are not functioning in an orderly manner, and redemptions in
hold.
2
"Regs. 270.18f-I, adopted June 14, 1971.
nICI MEMO., supra note 136, at 4.
'2 OECD Standard Rules 44 (27th Rule).
2
"ld. at 45.
225
1d.
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kind may be inappropriate as well under these circumstances since the
fund most likely will be in a better position to liquidate its assets than
the investor will be due to his fractional interest in them. However, when
the problem is one of the valuation rather than the liquidity of assets,
suspension of redemptions may be a tardy and stopgap remedy if the
valuation problem arises out of substantial investment by the fund in
inactively traded securities. Such a situation would appear to necessitate
preventive measures.
The OECD Standard Rules attempt in two ways to prevent problems
in respect to individual funds which might develop into circumstances
in which redemption might have to be suspended. The first is the requirement in the 16th Rule that "a high percentage of the assets of a
• . . [fund] (75% to 90%) shall be in a readily realizable form.""22 The
second is the provision in the 8th Rule that requires substantial diversity
in providing that a fund "shall not invest more than 5 to 15% of its assets
' 27
in the securities of any one investor.
In the further prevention of the conditions which might necessitate the
suspension of redemption, it is also quite possible that the regulating
authorities could take the view that substantial investments in assets
that are difficult to value and/or difficult to dispose of is absolutely
inconsistent with, and therefore violative of, the requirement of both the
OECD Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute
that the fund be continuously obligated to redeem its shares. The Securities and Exchange Commission has hinted at this approach in respect
to investments by United States open end funds in restricted securi228
ties.
The necessity of such rigid control over investment practices which
might result in the absence of liquidity is readily apparent when factors
frustrating adequate regulation once redemption is suspended are
viewed. Under the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute the only
remedy upon the suspension of redemption is the termination of new
sales of the fund in West Germany. This remedy is obviously unsatisfactory to the currently participating investor since new sales are often the
sole actual source of new cash with which to redeem his shares. On the
other hand, suits by the investors against the fund, through its German
"'id. at 34 (16th Rule).
22Id. at 27 (8th Rule). Compare id. (8th Rule) with Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b)
(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (2) (1970) in respect to a "diversified [management investment company]."
"'lnvestment Company Act Release No. 5847 (October 21, 1969), Accounting Series Release
No. 113 (October 21, 1969).
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representative,"' cannot be expected to yield satisfactorily when the
grounds for the suits are, in fact, the fund's real inability to provide for
even a small number of redeeming shareholder's claims. Thus, close
supervision of both the potential effect of investment practices upon
redemption and of the conditions under which redemption may be suspended seem too important to be left solely to regulation by the country
in which the fund is organized and domiciled, as is the practice with both
Standard Rules and the Statute.
C.

Depository Protections

It is more a European than American concept that substantial protection to investors in a mutual fund can be provided by close supervision
of the custodian of the fund's assets and that control of the custodian is
as important, if not more important, than control of the fund's management. Section 17(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 grants a
registered management company the choice of placing and maintaining
its securities and other investments in the custody of (1) a bank with an
aggregate capital, surplus and undivided profits of not less than
$500,000, or (2) a national securities exchange member firm, or (3) the
company itself.230 If the company retains the securities itself it is required to deposit them for the purpose of safekeeping. The 1970 amendments permit the fund to use more than one bank as custodians if it so
chooses but require that if "securities and similar investments" are in
the hands of a bank custodian, the fund's cash is to be in the hands of
the bank as well, on the grounds that "shareholders would appear entitled to expect that the cash held by the company would be afforded a
degree of protection similar to that given to securities. 2 3 '
In contrast, the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute's primary
requirement in respect to the structure of mutual funds selling shares in
Germany is that their assets be in the custody of a bank of deposit
(Depotbank) with characteristics of supervision over the account comparable to those required of the custodian bank of a domestic fund by
§ 11 (now § 12) of the 1957 Investment Company Statute.2 32 The mutual fund and the custodian bank must not have common agents and
22

See 1969 Investment Shares Statute § 2(1) and § 6. The Federal Supervisory Office for Credit

Affairs apparently regards as a major deficiency in the Statute that a domestic representative of
only the foreign-based mutual fund itself is required and not of the management company, the
underwriter or the custodian bank. See Investment Company Institute MEMO., No. 14-1971,
March 8, 1971, at 9-10.
3015 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f (1970). See id. § 80a-26(a) (1970).
23
H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1970).
1 11969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute § 2(2).
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employees; the Federal Supervisory Office for Credit Affairs must specifically approve the bank; the bank must have equity capital of at least
10,000,000 DM; it must hold the fund's securities in a blocked account,
must handle all purchases, sales and redemptions on instruction from
the fund, must see that the purchase and sale of portfolio assets are at
proper prices, and must control the payment of management fees and
expenses. 23 More significantly, the custodian bank must be "entitled
and obligated, in its own name" (1) to assert claims of the fund's investors against the fund, its management and any former custodian bank
and (2) to defend the fund against improper judgments and execu234
tions.
It is readily apparent that the placement of these responsibilities on
the custodian bank, going substantially beyond the custodial duties
usual in American law, can be an effective substitute for many of the
controls which have been omitted from the German Statute. Here the
tradition of regulation by expert exercise of fiduciary duty has been
honored rather than the American tradition of investor control. A
skilled bank custodian, to the extent that it is made specifically responsible under the regulatory scheme, is obviously better equipped to protect
the investor against mismanagement than is the nonskilled investor himself, or even perhaps diligent, but possibly nonskilled, independent directors.

235

At first there existed some substantial doubt as to whether a United
States custodian bank could offer the shareholder in a registered United
States investment company security comparable to that available under
the German domestic law requirements and thus enable a United States
registered fund to comply with this prerequisite to distribution in West
Germany.2 3 This problem has been solved substantially, however, by
the Federal Supervisory Office for Credit Affairs view that "the totality
of . . . [the United States] regulatory pattern (system of 'checks and
balances' as they put it) would generally be accepted . . . as satisfying
the requirement that there be comparable security to the role which
German custodian banks play in the case of German funds." The Supervisory Office thus recognizes that
unlike German funds, U.S. funds have shareholders with voting rights
2331957

Investment Company Statute § 12.

234

1d. § 12(8).

35
See
2
6See

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970).
Note, West German Regulation of Foreign Mutual Fund Distributions,3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 323, 333 (1970).
:
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(including the right to sue management) and a board of directors
(including independent directors), are subject to close regulation by the
SEC under the Investment Company Act, are subject to regulation by
State Securities Administrators, that the sales of shares of most mutual funds are also regulated by the NASD, that independent certified
public accountants as part of their audits make spot-checks on certain
fund activities, that funds make detailed periodic reports to the SEC
program, and
and shareholders and are subject to an SEC2 3inspection
7
that fund organizations carry fidelity bonds.
The Supervisory Office has indicated, however, that exculpatory
clauses in agreements limiting the liability of custodian banks to gross
negligence or willful misconduct are improper and that banks should be
38
held liable for ordinary negligence.1
The OECD Standard Rules assume a neutral position in respect to
the custody of assets, requiring only that the assets "be held in a manner
acceptable to the supervisory authority. ' ' 23 9 This position is apparently
the result of divergency of custodial practices in different countries.
The West German recognition that a key factor in the regulation of
mutual funds, i.e., the security for investors found in the powers and
duties of custodian banks under domestic law, can be supplied by the
alternative means of the total regulatory structure with respect to
United States registered investment companies, represents imaginative
regulation, particularly when the literal language of the § 2(2) of the
German Statute 240 does not quite suggest this. In the particular case this
interpretation seems both appropriate and justified. Such an interpretation is in fact possible on a much broader base in the United States
under § 7(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 which authorizes
the Securities and Exchange Commission,
upon application by an investment company organized or otherwise
created under the laws of a foreign country, to issue a conditional or
unconditional order permitting such company to register . . . and to
make a public offering of its securities . . . if the Commission finds

that, by reason of special circumstances or arrangements, it is both
legally and practically feasible effectively to enforce the provisions
: * . [of the Investment Company Act] against such company that the
consistent with the public interest
issuance of such order is otherwise
24
and the protection of investors. '
2'Investment Company Institute Memo. No. 14-1971, March 8, 1971, at 3.
1Id. at 10.
23

OECD Standard Rules 36 (18th Rule).
2401969 Investment Shares Statute § 2(2).
24115 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1970).
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CONCLUSION

In viewing critically the OECD Standard Rules and the 1969 Foreign
Investment Shares Statute it is necessary to keep in mind constantly the
limited purposes of each. This is particularly true in the case of the
OECD Standard Rules which are specifically designed only to provide
necessary minima and do not propose to present a comprehensive system for the regulation of mutual funds. Likewise, the 1969 Foreign
Investment Shares Statute deliberately does not attempt to regulate all
aspects of foreign-based mutual funds which are sold in Germany but
only to provide minimal safeguards which make these sales at least
tolerable.
In addition, it is readily apparent that the OECD Standard Rules are
the product of some disagreement and compromise among the participating 4 2 member nations and their experts. Of the 32 substantive rules
promulgated, five 243 leave key matters open to a determination of what
is acceptable to the supervisory authority. This inability to agree seems
to be not the product of political differences but rather the result of
ideological clashes in attitudes toward the regulatory role itself, and the
natural, but perhaps political, desire on the part of each country's representatives that his own country's current regulatory scheme and practices be able to meet the OECD minimal standards with minimal strain.
To the extent that this latter influence is at work, there exists a tendency
of the OECD Standard Rules to become the "lowest common denominator" of mutual fund regulation. This is a trend to be avoided, for in
this area in particular, in which the national attitudes are widely divergent because of differences in ideology, practical experience, and sophistication, uniformity and harmonization are less important goals than
effective regulation that provides sufficient protection and opportunity
to the domestic investor. It is to be hoped that in their continuing efforts
concerning mutual fund regulation the OECD's Committee on Financial Markets and its experts will concentrate on refinement and extension of the coverage of the standards by drawing on the empirical realities and will resist, so far as possible, any pressure for standards which
42
Of the 23 member nations, only 13, Austria, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States participated by providing expert representation. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Norway and Turkey did not. OECD
Standard Rules 73-75.
24 3
OECD Standard Rules 36 (18th Rule: Custody); Id. at 37 (19th Rule: Valuation of Assets);
Id. at 39 (22nd Rule: Incentive Fees); Id. at 49 (31st Rule: Advertising and Additional Sales
Literature); and Id. at 50 (32nd Rule: Salesmen).
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can have wide acceptability only because they achieve uniformity
through lack of real impuct. Unifmrmity, which is undoubtedly desirable
as mutuall funds become more prevalent as transnational vehicles of
investment, will in fact be achieved on a "highest common denominator" basis as multinational funds are required to meet the standards of
the country with the highest qualifications. The best that can be expected from international co-operation here is that it will harmonize
standards that are in direct conflict and eliminate those that are ineffective or unnecessary.
The limited purpose of the 1969 Foreign Investment Shares Statute
presents a more perplexing problem in that it creates a two-tiered regulatory arrangement in which mutual fund shares being sold in West
Germany are the subject of one of two very substantially different regulatory schemes depending solely upon whether the fund is organized
under domestic laws or under the laws of some foreign country. This
seems a very unsatisfactory distinction on which to base the regulatory
difference. Worse still, as this article has indicated, in various respects
the statutory scheme regulating foreign-based funds is substantially
more liberal than the scheme regulating domestic funds. As it stands,
the less scrupulous fund promoter organizing a new fund to be sold in
West Germany will likely choose to go "offshore" in order to avoid the
more rigorous domestic scrutiny. A countervailing factor exists to the
extent that the buying public is aware of the meaning of the absence of
the imprimatur of quality of the Federal Supervisory Office for Credit
Affairs with respect to foreign-based funds, but unfortunately no more
is really known about this than is known about the alleged attractiveness
to foreign investors of the fact that a United States registered fund must
meet the relatively rigorous requirements of the Investment Company
Act of 1940. Nevertheless, and despite the practical and administrative
difficulties in applying domestic German standards to offshore funds, a
substantial weakness can be seen in any regulatory scheme which offers
an incentive to escape from domestic controls.
It has been the purpose of this article to point out a number of the
basic differences in the regulatory impact of the three schemes examined
here. These regulatory differences may appear all the more striking as
the real economic structures of mutual funds achieve greater uniformity
through their increased transnational activities. To the extent that such
differences can be explained by variations in national regulatory habits
and attitudes, any discussion of them may have value only as scholarly
entertainment. On the other hand, if they are the product of real differences of opinion as to the efficacy of alternative methods in controlling
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the marketing of investment opportunities examination of them increases in importance. The greater portion of the resolution of these
questions of efficacy unfortunately has been attempted on an intuitive
rather than an empirical basis. Real evaluation of different practices in
the regulation of mutual funds and their results will have to await more
objective probing and measurement.

